Very challenging "game"

Decision makers may be able to agree on an arrangement of the 16 + 2 = 18 Groups in four (4) Coalitions. If they agree, Decision Makers' Pick in Rounds (DMPR) is a process that will not be necessary. It will be used only if decision makers are unable to reach an agreement. Eventhough DMPR may not happen, it will be examined very thoroughly by decision makers. Overall, it will be a very challenging "game" for decision makers, much harder than playing chess.

Decision makers are AntiNWO's supporters. NWO's supporters will not participate directly in decision making. Decision makers can be divided into two categories, leaders and assistants. Leaders will lead the decision making and assistants will assist. So far, leaders are North American Group A1, China and Northern - Eastern European Group E2. India can participate only if it cancels EU - India trade deal and renounces NWO's plan. If it participates, it will be in the leaders.

NWO's supporters can participate indirectly. Not allowing NWO's supporters to participate in AntiNWO's plan is very reasonable. If they were allowed, it will be like letting Nazis and Axis powers participate in Yalta Agreement. They can't participate in a plan that they do not support. Nevertheless, they could express their preferences to the leaders of the decision making.

Leaders are not obligated to take the preferences of non particiapants (NWO's supporters) seriously. They are not obligated to make an effort to satisfy their will to the extent possible. On the contrary, they are obligated to consider the preferences of the assistants very seriously and satisfy their will to the extend possible. This is one big difference between assistants and non participants. There is another one that will be explained later.

Each one of the leaders will make an arrangement of the Groups in four Coalitions. Mostly, they will deal with their Coalition. They will consider for their decision, their preferences and the preferences of the assistants. It is up to them, if they take into consideration the preferences of non participants (NWO's supporters). So there will be three or four (if India participates) arrangements or proposals.

Most likely, these will be different arrangements. It is very unlikely that the three or four (with India) leaders will come up with the same arrangements (combinations). So negotiations will have to be made in order to find an arrangement that could be accepted by all leaders. If they can reach an agreement, the arrangement accepted will be different than the three (or four) proposals of the three (or four) leaders.

Eventually, they will reach a compromise. But that compromise, may be close or far from the initial proposal of each leader. At this point, each leader would have to figure out what the result would be with the DMPR process. If they feel that the result will be more favorable to them with the DMPR process, they will decide to go for that and expect a much better outcome than the compromise that is on the table.

There is another difference between assistants and non participants. Assistants will have one or two vetoes. Currently, one seems more likely but two may be decided later. What can the veto do? There will be four Coalitions. If the assistants are placed in a Coalition they do not like, they can veto that placement. If they have two vetos, they can veto twice.

Two vetos make the process more complicated. If they veto once, there will be three Coalitions left. If they veto twice, there will be only two Coalitions left, in which they can be placed. Assistants should rank the Coalitions according to their preferences. When they veto a placement in a Coalition, they should consider the possibility of ending up with a placement in a Coalition that is below the initial placement.

These will be better understood with some examples. In the table below, the leaders have ranked their choices for their Coalitions. This is HYPOTHETICAL. We do NOT KNOW what the RANKING of the leaders' SELECTIONS will be. In China's (C) Coalition there will be two (2) more Groups. In North America's (A1) and Northern - Eastern Europe's (E2) Coalitions, there will be five (5) more Groups.

In this example, there are only three leaders. India is not included in the decision makers at all, due to EU-India deal. We will examine another example with India later. Obviously, none of the leaders can have their Coalition the way they want it because there is considerable overlapping. So they would have to negotiate with the other leaders, in order to reach a compromise.

We should point out that if the leaders can reach an agreement, TWO of the LEADERS can be in the SAME COALITION, if they want. This is NOT POSSIBLE in the DMPR process. The three or four leaders (with India) will be in different Coalitions. Suppose that two of the leaders want very much to be in the same Coalition. That would be an important reason to take what is on the table and avoid DMPR.

In the DMPR (Decision Makers' Pick in Rounds), the goal of each leader is to get the most favorable result, a Coalition that is closer to their choice. They will have the Groups they want in order. But they may not make the picks in that order. This will be better understood with the example. The first choice of A1 is A2 (Mexico, Cuba etc) and the second is R4 (Australia, New Zealand etc).

China's first choice is M3 (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan) and second choice is R4. We mentioned that China should make the first pick in the first round, since there will be only two other Groups in its Coalition. Nevertheless, this is just an opinion. The leaders may decide to draw numbers from a hat, instead of giving to China the first pick. In the example, we assume that China has the first pick.

In the first round, China will pick its first choice, M3. Next is the turn of A1 to make a pick. If they feel that a) China's second pick will be R4 b) R4 will not veto that pick c) A2 is below the third place in China's choices, they may pick R4 eventhough their first choice is A2. Because if they do not pick R4, China will get it in the second round and they will miss the opportunity to have their second choice R4 in their Coalition.

We must keep in mind that before China's second pick, is the first pick of Northern & Eastern European Group E2. So A1 must feel that E2 will not have A2 as the first choice either. Because if that happens, by trying to ensure the participation of their second choice R4, they may loose their first choice A2. In the example, A2 is seventh choice for E2 and eighth for China.

Game theory deals with issues like these. Game theory studies strategic, interdependent decision-making, where the outcome for a participant (player) depends on the actions of others. A safer approach for the leaders, may be to follow the order of their ranking in their picks. So the first choice will be picked first, the second second etc. But this may not lead to the most favourable outcome.